The Gulf scholar discusses Saudi Arabia’s transformation, diverging regional strategies and the choices facing Iraq and the Kurdistan Region.

Dr. Kristin Smith Diwan is a Senior Resident Scholar at the Arab Gulf States Institute, where she examines generational change, nationalism and the evolution of Islamism across the Gulf Cooperation Council countries. Her scholarship connects the domestic transformation of Gulf societies with the political choices shaping the wider region. Her analysis has appeared in Foreign Affairs, the Financial Times and The Washington Post.

She earned her PhD at Harvard University and holds a master’s degree from the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies. Previously an assistant professor at American University’s School of International Service, she has also held visiting scholar positions at George Washington University and Georgetown University. As a visiting senior fellow at the Atlantic Council in 2013 and 2014, she published on youth movements and contributed to its Strategic Dialogue for a New US-Gulf Partnership. Her 2026 analysis examines Gulf autonomy, regional security and the evolving role of the United States.

In this interview with GULAN Weekly Magazine, Diwan explains how social and economic change in Saudi Arabia intersects with a more uncertain regional order. She considers the strains on Gulf security partnerships, Iraq’s difficult position and the Kurdistan Region’s opportunities to build mutually beneficial ties while retaining strategic autonomy.

Generational change and Saudi nationalism

GULAN: Your research examines generational change, nationalism, and the evolution of Islamism across the Gulf Cooperation Council countries. How are younger generations and emerging forms of national identity reshaping the political character of Gulf states, particularly Saudi Arabia?

Kristin Smith Diwan: The generational shift in Saudi Arabia has been fundamental to both the social and political changes in the country. The new wired generation demanded more creative outlets and entertainment options. It expressed an outlook more open and globally integrated. And it voiced greater ambition for Saudi Arabia. Mohammed bin Salman captured a core of this youth population and directed it toward the Vision 2030 plan and Saudi Arabia’s new nationalist orientation. Urban youth are the key political constituency and economic workforce driving his political and national ambitions forward.

Economic transformation and regional stability

GULAN: Saudi Arabia has pursued an ambitious domestic transformation while adopting a more assertive role in regional and international affairs. How would you assess the kingdom’s evolving priorities, and to what extent are economic modernization, nationalism, and regional influence now interconnected?

Kristin Smith Diwan: Saudi Arabia’s priority is its economic transformation, which is necessitated by the need to diversify beyond oil and hydrocarbons due to the global transition toward alternative sources of energy and the impossibility of the country relying upon this one industry. The current government strategy is one of broader global economic integration which expands economic possibilities as well as Saudi Arabia’s influence. Achieving this requires a profound social transformation as well: to bring women into the workforce and public life; to train and empower the younger generation to excel in new fields and industries; and to attract global talent. At this stage, it also relies upon massive state investment which Saudi Arabia is drawing from both hydrocarbon export revenues and new equity and borrowing from the industry. The state project and mobilization of the youthful workforce are tied together through the Saudi Vision 2030 platform and a new nationalist outlook. None of this is possible without stability in the region.

Gulf solidarity and strategic differences

GULAN: In your March 2026 article, Gulf States Play Defense, you argued that Gulf countries were attempting to preserve their autonomy while facing Iranian attacks and pressure from the United States and Israel. Has the conflict created a more unified Gulf security outlook, or has it exposed important differences among the GCC states?

Kristin Smith Diwan: The Gulf states came into the war with important differences in their strategic positioning and outlook. At points, the war has highlighted these: Oman’s greater tolerance for Iran and commitment to “active neutrality”; Qatar’s greater dependence on Iran and preference for negotiation; the UAE’s strategic ties to Israel and willingness to lean into that for both military and political support; Saudi Arabia’s discomfort with both Iranian and Israeli expansionism and commitment to de-escalation. The threat from Iran thus has not brought them into complete alignment. But there have been constant communications among the Gulf states and efforts to coordinate their diplomatic and security reactions where possible.

The competition between Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates was at a high point on the eve of the war and I do think the war has underlined some of these fundamental differences in their regional strategies. At times during the war the UAE has been more hawkish in its orientation towards Iran, more willing to retaliate militarily, and more closely aligned with the U.S. and Israeli campaign. Saudi Arabia has also retaliated militarily to regain deterrence, but its preference has been de-escalation. Its concern for both Iranian and Israeli escalation in the region has driven it to seek new alliances that can form a regional bulwark pressing for the stabilization of the region.

Balancing deterrence and dialogue

GULAN: Gulf governments have worked in recent years to manage tensions with Iran while maintaining their longstanding security relationships with Washington. Following the Iran war, is this policy of strategic balance still sustainable, or will Gulf states increasingly be required to make more difficult choices between deterrence, dialogue, and alignment?

The search for a new regional security framework

GULAN: In another recent article, The United States Plus: Gulf States Contemplate Regional Security After Iran War, you examined Gulf thinking about the regional order following the conflict. What kind of security architecture are Gulf states now seeking, and what role do they envision for the United States within it?

Kristin Smith Diwan: Gulf thinking about regional security and the role of the United States within it has shifted over the course of the war. Gulf states initially opposed the current military campaign against Iran, and for good reason: they knew that they would be the primary targets of Iranian retaliation. Once initiated, however, the Gulf states quickly understood the critical importance of the United States in providing for their aerial defense. That reliance on American military and security cooperation remains. However, the American decision to attempt regime change, assassinating Iran’s leader, has changed the strategic calculus of Iran. American bases in the region no longer play the role of deterring Iran, and in fact, invite Iranian attacks. And Iran has seized the Strait of Hormuz, giving it previously unrealized leverage over Gulf states’ economies, and even the global economy.

This is forcing a profound reassessment of regional security. The shifting positions of the Trump administration have unnerved Gulf leaders and made them less willing to tie their current positions to its actions and their future security to the United States alone. However, making accommodations with Iran is even more difficult now.

This will strengthen the Gulf search to diversify its security partners, as evidenced by new contracts with Ukraine and, importantly, Saudi Arabia’s leadership in bringing together the quartet with Turkey, Pakistan and Egypt. They will continue to turn to the international community to add pressure, as seen through Bahrain’s initiatives through the United Nations Security Council. And to differing degrees, they will test Iran’s terms for de-escalation. Still, none of this is fully in their hands. And none of this fully replaces the security umbrella once provided by the United States. It does, however, reflect the transitional period we are living through.

Iraq and its Gulf relationships

GULAN: Iraq is geographically and politically situated between the Gulf states and Iran, while also maintaining an important relationship with the United States. How have the recent regional confrontations affected Iraq’s position, and could stronger political and economic engagement from Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf states help Baghdad achieve greater regional balance?

Kristin Smith Diwan: The war has been extremely hard on Iraq. While currently undertaking yet another government transition, it has had to deal with attacks undertaken by militias from its territory, attacks by Iran in the north, and retaliation by the U.S. and Saudi Arabia. Its entire shipping access has been blocked by Iran’s seizure of the Strait of Hormuz. The weight of Iran on its politics and economy is substantial.

There has been some relief of the shipping crisis by the shipment of oil via tanker trucks through Syria to Mediterranean ports. This underlines the need for regional partnerships to offset the costs of the war and to counterbalance Iranian influence. Still, at the moment, the Gulf states and especially Saudi Arabia are in no mood to strengthen their engagement with Iraq’s government. Their policy of patient engagement has been abandoned under the provocation of missile/drone attacks by Iraqi militias against Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. This has placed Saudi Arabia in a more punitive mindset, viewing Iraq and Yemen as extensions or vectors of the Iranian threat.

Kurdistan and the changing regional order

GULAN: The Kurdistan Region has been directly exposed to the consequences of tensions among Iran, the United States, and their regional partners. From your perspective, how should the Kurdistan Region navigate this changing security environment, and what role could stronger relations with Saudi Arabia and the wider Gulf play in supporting its stability and economic development?

Kristin Smith Diwan: Iraqi Kurdistan has suffered from both American designs to use Kurdish opposition against Iran and Iranian retaliation against both the Kurds and the American presence in Erbil. This has resulted in damage to critical infrastructure, including Erbil International Airport, the Swara Tika oilfield, and the Harir Air Base.

This difficult security environment beset by shifting regional alliances poses considerable risks to the Kurds, yet it may also increase their value as political actors. The possibility of deploying the Kurds to help contain Iran or even as a transnational vector to be mobilized against Tehran has already been contemplated by the Israelis and Americans. Caution is nonetheless advisable, as the dangers of being swept up in another country’s political project have proven costly in the past.

Perhaps understanding this potential power and using it as a bargaining chip with other regional players is a more fruitful strategy. Demonstrating their usefulness, rather than presenting a threat, has already paid dividends with both the Iraqi federal government and Turkey. The Kurdistan Regional Government’s role in providing an alternate transit route for Iraqi oil exports overland and through the Kurdish pipeline network to Turkey’s Ceyhan port has earned both profit and goodwill. Finding other areas of mutual benefit within the region’s expanding interconnectivity projects while maintaining some strategic autonomy seems like a good bet.