Bamo Nouri is a scholar, investigative journalist, and writer focused on U.S. foreign policy and Middle East politics. He holds a PhD in international politics and is an Honorary Research Fellow at City, University of London. He has taught at several UK universities, including University of Manchester, and is the author of Elite Theory and the 2003 Iraq Occupation by the United States. He is also active in global initiatives such as United Nations Academic Impact and One Young World.

Gulan: Your recent work suggests that the U.S.–Israel alliance persists not because tensions are absent, but because they are strategically managed. At this stage, do you see this relationship as still anchored in shared long-term interests, or increasingly sustained by institutional momentum and the absence of viable alternatives?

Dr. Bamo Nouri: The U.S.–Israel relationship has always been more complex than the language of unwavering alliance suggests. In my work, I argue that its durability lies not in the absence of tension, but in the consistent management of those tensions through institutional, military, and diplomatic channels. At this stage, the relationship remains anchored in shared long-term interests - particularly around regional military superiority, intelligence cooperation, and the containment of perceived adversaries such as Iran. However, it is increasingly sustained by institutional momentum: decades of integrated defence systems, congressional support, and entrenched policy frameworks that make recalibration difficult.

At the same time, the absence of viable alternatives reinforces this dynamic. For Washington, Israel remains a uniquely capable regional partner; for Israel, U.S. backing is indispensable. Even when disagreements emerge - over tactics, escalation, or regional strategy - they are absorbed rather than resolved. This creates a relationship that is both resilient and rigid: adaptable in the short term, but resistant to structural change.

Gulan: You characterize the current Middle East conflict as one that resists decisive outcomes. In such a landscape, how do political leaders redefine “success,” and does this shift risk entrenching a cycle where conflict itself becomes a tool of governance rather than a problem to be resolved?

Dr. Bamo Nouri: In a conflict environment that resists decisive outcomes, “success” is steadily redefined in narrower, more tactical terms. Rather than victory in a conventional sense, leaders emphasise the degradation of enemy capabilities, temporary deterrence, or the management of escalation. This is particularly evident across recent Middle Eastern conflicts, where cycles of confrontation and pause replace clear endpoints. In such a landscape, the absence of resolution is not necessarily framed as failure, but as a form of strategic equilibrium.

What is often underexamined, however, is how this condition aligns with the material interests of powerful economic sectors. Prolonged instability - short of full-scale systemic collapse - can be highly profitable. The defence industry benefits from sustained procurement cycles, replenishment of stockpiles, and long-term contracts tied to interoperability and alliance structures. At the same time, volatility in energy markets - especially in chokepoints like the Strait of Hormuz - can generate price fluctuations that benefit producers, traders, and associated financial actors. As my recent work argues, this creates an uncomfortable reality: while publics overwhelmingly express fatigue with war and instability, there are entrenched sectors for whom conflict without resolution is economically advantageous.

These dynamic risks entrenching a cycle in which conflict becomes normalised not only politically but economically. When key industries are structurally positioned to benefit from ongoing instability, the incentives for genuine resolution weaken. Conflict, in this sense, shifts from being a problem to be solved into a condition to be managed - one that sustains both strategic postures and economic returns, even as it imposes enduring costs on societies across the region.

Gulan: In your analysis of the Strait of Hormuz, you point to the fragility of a corridor that underpins global energy flows. How close is the region, in your view, to a threshold moment where a limited confrontation could trigger disproportionate global economic and security consequences?

Dr. Bamo Nouri: The Strait of Hormuz is not simply a chokepoint - it is the pressure valve of the global economy. What recent analysis makes clear is that we are already operating dangerously close to a threshold moment. This is not just about disruption, but about cumulative strain. The current conflict has moved beyond short-term “risk premiums” and into what the International Energy Agency describes as one of the largest supply disruptions in modern history, with millions of barrels per day removed and key infrastructure damaged across the region.

What is particularly concerning - and often underestimated - is how little slack remains in the system. Strategic reserves in OECD countries and the United States can cushion initial shocks, but they were never designed to sustain prolonged, system-wide disruption. As I’ve argued elsewhere, we are now entering the later phase of an energy crisis where many industries - aviation, shipping, manufacturing - are no longer dealing with temporary volatility but with tightening access to fuel itself. Reserves are being drawn down, alternative routes are insufficient, and commercial shipping decisions are increasingly dictated by insurance risk rather than military assurances.  

This is where the danger of disproportionate consequences emerges. In a tightly coupled system, even limited confrontation - whether through tanker attacks, infrastructure strikes, or partial closure of Hormuz - can cascade globally. Prices spike, supply chains seize, and inflationary pressures spread rapidly across economies, as already seen in rising fuel costs and broader economic instability.   The longer the conflict persists without resolution, the more it shifts from a geopolitical crisis to a systemic one. At that point, the question is no longer whether disruption will occur, but when a relatively small trigger tips an already strained system into a full-scale global economic shock.

Gulan: To what extent is contemporary U.S. engagement in the Middle East guided by a coherent strategic vision, as opposed to short-term crisis management, and how does this distinction shape the credibility of American policy in the eyes of regional actors?

Dr. Bamo Nouri: U.S. policy in the Middle East is often described as reactive, but it’s more accurate to see it as part of a longer pattern of imperial containment - an effort to manage and constrain regional actors, particularly Iran, without resolving the underlying conflicts. What we’re seeing now is that this approach is under real strain. Iran has demonstrated an ability not just to absorb pressure, but to respond in ways that raise the cost of escalation - whether through regional proxies or by threatening critical chokepoints like the Strait of Hormuz. That has clearly influenced U.S. decision-making.

At the same time, there’s been a visible contradiction in how the U.S. is operating. We’ve seen military escalation occurring alongside attempts at negotiation, including strikes taking place in close proximity to diplomatic efforts. From the perspective of regional actors, that undermines credibility. It creates the impression that diplomacy is being used tactically rather than as a genuine pathway to de-escalation.

Overlaying all of this is the impact of Israel’s war in Gaza. There is a growing international debate over whether what is happening constitutes genocide, and the U.S.’s very close alignment with Israel has significantly shaped how its role is perceived. For many in the region and beyond, Washington’s position appears inconsistent - particularly in its application of international law. That has real consequences for soft power.

So, the issue isn’t just whether the U.S. has a strategy - it’s whether that strategy is seen as coherent and credible. Right now, the combination of containment, escalation during negotiations, and unconditional alignment with Israel is eroding that credibility, and that has long-term implications for how U.S. influence is exercised in the region.

Gulan: There is a growing perception that the architecture of power in the Middle East is shifting away from centralized state control toward more fragmented and networked forms of influence. How does this transformation alter the logic of deterrence, negotiation, and long-term stability in the region?

Dr. Bamo Nouri: What we’re seeing across the Middle East is a clear shift away from centralised, state-to-state power toward something much more fragmented and networked. Non-state actors - militias, paramilitary groups, and transnational networks - are now exercising forms of influence that were once the monopoly of states. That fundamentally changes how power operates in the region. Traditional deterrence models rely on identifiable actors, clear lines of accountability, and the threat of retaliation. But when your adversary is diffuse, embedded across borders, or plausibly deniable, deterrence becomes far less predictable.

For policymakers, that creates a much more complex operating environment. You can no longer assume that pressure applied to a state will translate into control on the ground. These networks often have their own internal logic, funding streams, and political agendas. As a result, negotiations that focus purely on state actors risk missing the real drivers of conflict. Stability, in this context, becomes less about reaching a single agreement and more about managing a constantly shifting eco system of actors and interests.

In practical terms, the region is moving away from a classic balance-of-power system toward what I would call a balance-of-friction. Control is partial, contested, and often temporary. You’re not resolving conflicts so much as containing and managing them. This makes long-term stability much harder to achieve, because the underlying structures that sustain conflict remain intact even when formal agreements are reached.

Gulan: For the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, which sits at the intersection of regional rivalries and internal Iraqi dynamics, how do current geopolitical tensions reshape its strategic options, particularly in balancing relations with Baghdad, neighboring states, and international partners while preserving its autonomy?

Dr. Bamo Nouri: For the KRI, this evolving landscape presents both a constraint and a missed opportunity. On one level, the region remains caught in a complex balancing act - between Baghdad, regional powers like Iran and Turkey, and international actors such as the United States. These overlapping pressures limit manoeuvrability and make autonomy contingent on external dynamics as much as internal decisions.

However, the deeper issue is that Kurdish strategy has historically leaned too heavily on external alignment rather than internal capacity. As I’ve written elsewhere, Kurdish foreign policy has often functioned more as orientation than strategy - relying on partnerships, particularly with the United States, without developing the institutional leverage or long-term planning needed to sustain autonomy. This creates a cycle of dependency, where external actors shape outcomes more than Kurdish agency does.

Yet the KRI is not without alternatives. It possesses the foundations of a functioning free-market economy, significant natural resources, and a relatively open political and business environment compared to its surroundings. The missed opportunity lies in not fully leveraging these assets through a coherent, knowledge-driven strategy. That would mean investing in independent policy institutions, economic diversification, human capital, and governance systems that prioritise transparency and accountability - issues that are directly reflected in domestic challenges such as unpaid public sector wages and fiscal mismanagement.

In a fragmented regional system, smaller actors can carve out space - but only if they convert internal capacity into strategic leverage. For the KRI, the path forward is not simply balancing external relationships more effectively, but rethinking the internal foundations of power itself: building an economy and knowledge base that reduce dependency, increase resilience, and allow it to act, rather than react, within an increasingly volatile Middle East.

By Kobin Ferhad