Christopher Morris (PhD, University of Toronto) is Professor Emeritus of Philosophy and former chair of department. His interests are in moral and political philosophy, practical ethics, legal theory, and the theory of practical rationality. His main project is a book tentatively entitled Social Order, Liberty, and Prosperity: Political Philosophy for our Age. Other topics include justice and reasons for action, the contractarian tradition, and a number of questions about moral standing. He is also editing two volumes of David Gauthier’s essays for Oxford.

Gulan:  Professor Morris, in your work you describe the “state” as a modern form of political organization. In your recent book Social Order, Liberty, and Prosperity, you argue that securing “social order” is a serious challenge. In your view, is the nation state still the best model for guaranteeing liberty and prosperity in the twenty first century, or does humanity need a new form of social contract?

Professor Morris: The concept of the state can be understood in several different ways, depending largely on one’s purposes. In my book An Essay on the Modern State (1998) I wanted to think of states very abstractly as particular forms of political organization. But sometimes it is useful to talk about states as a collection of institutions that can act in certain ways. I’ll say a bit more below in my replies to some of your other questions.

In the post-Soviet 1990s, many in the West thought that the international system might be entering a new phase, where many thought that major conflicts between the big states might a thing of the past. Until the attacks of 9/11 (New York and Washington), the last decade of the 20th c. was a period of relative optimism: the end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the Soviet empire in Eastern Europe, peace in Northern Ireland, the end of apartheid in S. Africa, some movement on peace between Israel and Palestinians, the development of international trade, the internet. In much of the world this was a good time. Social conflict seemed more manageable. The tone of my book on the modern state reflected the optimism of the ‘90s. Specifically the problem of social order seemed manageable. We can think of social order as the contrary of social disorder, namely, stable, regular, predictable patterns of behavior and of cooperation. Minimally, social order will require the basic security of persons and possessions, as well as considerable trust. Securing social order is a problem because it often requires considerable effort on the part of people and, in communities larger than families and clans, it usually requires institutions. Government and law – agents of the state – usually play a major role securing social order in large societies, along with the behavior of individuals.

States like the Canada, Spain, the United Kingdom, are often thought of as “nation-states”. I think that label can be confusing as these are in fact multi-national states – states containing distinct nationalities (French Canadians, Catalans and Basques, Scots and Welsh). I think of Japan and Germany until recently as nation states, as most of the citizens were members a distinct nationality – it is still today much easier to obtain Japanese citizenship if one has Japanese ancestry. You ask, “is the nation state still the best model for guaranteeing liberty and prosperity in the twenty first century?” A very good question. Nation-states like Japan can be very stable. A common nationality can help maintain social order. I have no doubts about this. But Japan will run out of people if it does not accept immigrants; most countries today need to be multi-national (or multi-ethnic and multi-cultural). Even Israel, which is said to be a Jewish state, has considerable numbers of non-Jews (around 25%). I’ll say more about this when address your questions about federalism below. So, while a nation-state – a state whose citizens are mostly members of a single national group – is not required for liberty and prosperity, a state or something similar may well be, in particular a constitutional democracy with strong protections for important liberties.

Gulan:  You have lived in Paris and Brussels and are familiar with the history of Europe. After the Second World War, Europe managed to transform a continent filled with conflict into an example of peace through what became the European Union. From the perspective of political philosophy, what was the foundational idea behind this integration? And can this model of supranationalism be replicated in other regions of the world, such as the Middle East?

Professor Morris: The European Union has lots of problems, very much on the minds of European political leaders. But it is an important political development – a form of political organization – and provides a model for a kind of economic and political integration that may be valuable elsewhere. Rebuilding Western Europe after WWII was a gigantic task, and American aid was important. But most European states existed before the war and had years if not centuries of experience administering law and commerce as well as relations between states. This experience and history proved important to recovery.

The EU in its current form was the product of decades of agreements and developments. And, as I said, it has lots of problems. We might think of it as a creative series of agreements, starting with The European Coal and Steel Community in the early 1950s. It originally aimed at securing the peace between France and Germany, longtime enemies. The current forms of the European Union have not led to the disappearance of European nationalities or identities. One might think that some similar agreements might change the political organization of Iraq in ways that would enhance the autonomy of the Kurdish community there. While I have no expertise here, it is hard to see how the entire Kurdish nation could be unified in a single state; it is hard to imagine Turkey, Iran, and probably the other parts of Iraq permitting this. (Iran is very weak now, but Turkey certainly is not.) The lesson one might draw from the history of the EU is that political settlements that succeed usually take a form that is suited for the political histories and cultures of their parties. The EU developed in Western Europe after centuries of war. Perhaps this is possible in Iraq or at least might offer the Kurdish people greater security and liberty.

Gulan:  Regarding federal systems around the world, is federalism merely a technical tool for dividing political authority, or is it a political philosophy intended to preserve pluralism? Can a federal system replace the kind of “shared civic culture” that you describe as necessary for diverse communities to coexist?

Professor Morris: Federal states are an important innovation in modern times. Of course, the idea existed in older times, namely in empires. In ancient and modern times empires were built on conquest. Empires are normally large, and the mother country, to use an old term, usually governed its territories or colonies indirectly, through intermediaries. After all, the imperial powers did not initially know the people and cultures they had conquered. To govern them they needed to find local social classes that could govern for them. This is early federalism. Of course, federal systems are thought to be based on consent, whereas empires are not. But most European states were founded in war, and some empires (e.g., Rome) extended citizenship to its conquered people. In any case there are many forms of indirect rule, and many of these can be very helpful for governing large countries with significant cultural and political differences or antagonisms. I do think that federal systems may need a shared political or civic culture in order to hold together. In general, all political arrangements require attitudes of respect and obedience to law to survive. Few states can survive without the active support of many citizens and the acquiescence of others. Saddam Hussein’s “Republic of Fear” may have lacked a shared civic culture; another recent example would have been Syria. But for the most part it’s hard to imagine a decent society lacking shared political culture. My country may put this to the test as it is increasingly hard to find a share political culture.

Gulan:  The Middle East has long struggled with conditions of “statelessness” or “failed states.” You argue that liberty and prosperity cannot exist without functioning institutions and the rule of law. For a region like the Middle East, which political philosophy offers a realistic path out of turmoil and toward stability? Does establishing order first require coercive force, or should democratic legitimacy come before stability?

Professor Morris: I’m not comfortable with the notion of a “failed state”. It suggests something or someone that did not succeed in reaching a goal or objective. Middle Eastern countries have borders, drawn not that long ago by European powers, but they may lack several of the important features of modern states. Some have governments in name only as they don’t control all of the territory attributed to the country. Legitimacy is an important notion, though one that is unclear and deployed differently by various people. One thought is often that a legitimate state or government is one that has the right to exist and to rule. Such a right implies that others have a duty to obey the law (i.e., valid laws). It is hard to imagine that Saddam Hussein or Assad (father or son) were heads of legitimate states or governments. It would have prudent for most to follow their commands, but they presumably had no duty to obey.

I can’t imagine that the major countries in the Middle East can hold together and prosper without the rule of law and decent laws, and these require judicial institutions that are independent of the current rulers. And in most cases I imagine that some of the institutions need to be democratic with some officials selected by popular vote. It’s important to remember that established democracies like the US and France are best described as republics with some democratic institutions, constrained by law. Enlarging the scope of democratic choice may destabilize a country. A remark made by President Erdoğan when he was mayor and repeated by Mohamed Morsi was that democracy is like a train/tram, one gets off when it reaches one’s station. A democracy cannot last if many people share the attitude expressed by that saying.

Broadly, one might expect that political traditions associated with republican democracy or constitutional democracy would best support stability and prosperity. It is important to have laws that protect and empower everyone, not just powerful elites, especially laws protecting commerce and private organizations. It is common to think of the American (federal) political system as having been designed and brought into existence by the original Founders. But important elements of the American system were later innovations and in fact creations of individual states (like Indiana or Massachusetts). The right to set up a business, or club, or church or any organization was generalized and accorded to all citizens only in the middle 19th century. Before that time if one wanted to charter a bank or corporation, one would have to go to the state assembly and obtain the charter – and these assemblies were controlled by a political party and wouldn’t help everyone. Laws were gradually changed to allow any citizen to walk into a state office, fill out a form and pay a fee, and receive permission. Societies like these are “open access social orders”, where laws apply to everyone (see Violence and Social Orders by Douglass North, John Wallis, and Barry Weingast). Social order to some extent can be secured prior to the institutions of constitutional democracy, but one doesn’t want this process to increase the powers of traditional rulers who oppose constitutional government and democracy.

Gulan: The Kurds are the largest stateless nation in the world, divided among four countries (Iraq, Turkey, Iran, and Syria). From the standpoint of theories of justice and political morality, do the Kurds have a moral right to seek independence if these states fail to provide security and justice? And which strategy is more justified for them: working toward reform and equal citizenship within the existing states, or striving to establish an independent political entity?

Professor Morris: The question of a right to a state of one’s own is more controversial than it seems. The opening paragraph of the American Declaration of Independence seems to accord every people such a right. But the thesis and its details are controversial – American fought a civil war over the matter. There is general agreement that groups that have serious grievances or face serious threats may secede. But usually this permission is qualified by a condition that requires that seeking independence won’t make things worse. I think the practical questions of what might best serve the interests of Kurds in Iraq may be the hardest ones here. A time may come when Kurds in Iraq may be able to secede, perhaps in conjunction with Kurds elsewhere. It is hard for outsiders who aren’t not well informed and won’t bear the costs of failure to judge. But from my perspective, Syria may be in turmoil for a while, but Turkey and Iran may assist the rest of Iraq to prevent secession. (And the US can no longer be counted on for very much.)

Gulan:  The Iraqi Constitution defines the country as a federal state, yet in practice there are deep tensions between Baghdad and the Kurdistan Region. In your view, when trust and a shared civic culture are absent among constituent groups (Kurds, Sunnis, and Shi’as), can federalism succeed, or does it become merely a temporary arrangement before eventual fragmentation?

Professor Morris: A difficult question. The original thirteen colonies of late 18th century British American almost lost their war of independence. Tactical decisions can be very difficult. I suppose that even if Iraqi federalism is likely to be a temporary arrangement, it may nevertheless be the best option for now. (A political comment. At this time our friends and allies cannot depend on the US government for help or support.)

Gulan:  The Kurdistan Region has its own government and parliament, yet it exists in a highly unstable neighborhood. For the region to become a distinctive model of rule of law and prosperity, as you describe in your recent work, what are the most important institutions the Kurds should focus on building and strengthening?

Professor Morris: Abstractly I think that a competent and just legal system, especially one that protects the legal rights of citizens, both those protecting their person as well as their property, might be crucial. Liberty requires these protections, and commerce does also. I note that these protections require decent, competent institutions. But they also require citizens prepared to respect the rights of others. But I don’t know enough to suggest anything more concrete.

Gulan:  In your writings, you emphasize that maintaining social order is much harder than many people assume. As guidance for Kurdish leaders and intellectuals in the Middle East, how can they strike the right balance between creating a strong state capable of providing security and preserving individual liberty so as not to drift toward authoritarianism?

Professor Morris: Citizens can do a lot to provide security and to protect liberty. It’s important to remember that a political system depends a lot on the more-or-less voluntary behavior of most citizens; state enforcement cannot do everything. Some number of people will be dishonest and predatory – one hopes a small number. If a large number of people will obey most laws most the time, especially the important laws, then this may be sufficient. If most people pay their (fair) taxes, act honestly, and the like, social order can be secured and maintained. To take a minor example, if no one is prepared to respect traffic laws, then the result on the roads of large cities is chaos (Cairo the last time I was there); if most but not all do, the result can be tolerable or good (many American cities); if everyone respects the traffic law (German cities years ago), that can be great. The same is true for respect for the liberty and property of others.