Professor Jan Rovny to Gulan: Ethnic Minority Representatives Can Be Skillful Politicians Who Strengthen Democracy
Jan Rovny is a professor of political science at the Center for European Studies and Comparative Politics at Sciences Po, Paris. His research concentrates on political competition in Europe with the aim of uncovering the political conflict lines in different countries. He explores the issues that political parties contest across the continent, the strategies that different parties follow, as well as the preferences and voting patterns of voters. He is interested in the impact of different voter profiles, particularly their ethnicity and exposure to various social risks, on their political attitudes and voting behavior, as well as on the forms of their political representation. His recent book “Ethnic Minorities, Political Competition, and Democracy: Circumstantial Liberals” studies the effect of ethnic minority politics on democracy. He is one of the principal investigators of the Chapel Hill Expert Survey on party positioning, and of the Horizon Europe project AUTHLIB studying the varieties of opposition to liberal democracy. He teachs courses in comparative politics and quantitative methodology, and advise students studying parties, electoral behavior, or ethnic politics in Europe. I act as the academic advisor to the Sciences Po Summer School. He is an associate editor of East European Politics and Societies: and Cultures. In an interview, he answered our questions like the following:
Gulan: To set the stage for our discussion, could you begin by outlining the main ideas behind your research on political competition, identity politics, and the effects of ethnic and social divisions in Europe on modern democratic life?
Professor Jan Rovny: One of the main roots of my thinking about democratic politics draws on the classical works of Seymour Martin Lipset and Stein Rokkan who argue that key social divides frame democratic political supply, as well as William Riker, who conversely suggests that politics can be driven by skillful strategies of politicians. Political competition is thus codetermined by deep historically anchored cleavages that evolve and that are simultaneously interpreted, framed, and worked around by political entrepreneurs.
Much of my work has focused on understanding the political influence of economic concerns, particularly various social risks stemming from technological change and social development of post-industrial societies. Similarly, I have been drawn to studying the impact of non-economic, identity concerns on politics. Identity has bad reputation in social science, because – in line with the big ideologies of modern time, liberalism and socialism – we consider identity pre- or even anti-modern. Consequently, we think of identity as particularistic and opposed to ideological political competition, which we tend to associate with economic politics. Yet, even in the 21st century, we all have identities, and some of them can become very important to us. My work has explored how ethnic identity can inform political preferences, and how representation of ethnic minorities can infuse democratic political competition with ideological content.
Gulan: According to your work, ethnic minorities frequently turn into "circumstantial liberals," endorsing liberal institutions as a calculated reaction to vulnerability rather than out of intellectual commitment. What does this realization say about the weakness or strength of democratic standards, and how does it contradict the traditional view of liberalism as a moral position?
Professor Jan Rovny: My work starts from the premise that ethnic minorities are dual minorities. First, unlike majority populations, they are importantly concerned about the ability to maintain their group specificities -- to be able to live out their particular group characteristics, with respect and dignity. These are often very profound demands that require both tolerance and significant financial burden on the part of the state, and thus of the majority population. Second, as minorities, they are likely to be outvoted in majoritarian democratic processes, leaving their unique goals unfulfilled.
To protect their aims in this context, ethnic minorities in democracies have a reasonable path, to champion liberal constitutional principles that seek minority rights and constrain majoritarian decision-making.
But this path is ‘circumstantial’ – it works when ethnic minority representatives do not see better alternatives, one of which is of course seeking to exit minority status via secession or irredenta. Here liberalism isn’t a moral position, it is a pragmatic position – an effective, and normatively acceptable solution to a practical problem concerning minority rights and interests. I would, however, suggest that all citizens, even majorities, approach liberal democracy pragmatically. Winston Churchill’s quip that democracy “is the worst form of Government except for all those other forms that have been tried” suggests that we accept it not out of moral imperative, but out of relative utility.
Gulan: Political parties regularly use ethnicity as a tool in the situations you look at, either to mobilize minority identity or to politicize it in order to win elections. What factors, in your opinion, determine whether ethnic minority politics strengthen democratic pluralism or hasten its decline?
Professor Jan Rovny: It matters who mobilizes ethnicity and to what end. In the European cases I study, ethnicity is often mobilized by majority nationalist leaders who seek to shift political salience towards cultural issues, scapegoat ethnic minorities, and mobilize (a segment of) majority voters. This was for example carried out by some failing post-communist parties in countries like Bulgaria, Romania or Slovakia, and is routinely carried out by radical right parties across the continent. This form of ethnic mobilization systematically and gravely imperils democracy.
Ethnic mobilization can have a positive democratic effect when it is carried out by ethnic minority representatives who seek to protect minority rights. In this context, parties representing ethnic minorities frequently tend to seek cooperation with likeminded (liberal) factions of the majority, which strengthens the constitutional liberal pole of politics, and can render democracy more resilient.
Several conditions help this process. First, it is useful for the minority party to have reasonably significant electoral base, so that it can elect more representatives that can become useful partners to other groups in legislatures. Second, it helps to have (liberal) majority partners open to inter-ethnic cooperation. Third, ethnic minorities that are defined by other characteristics than religion tend to be more flexible, and thus easier to cooperate with. Finally, it is important that the ethnic groups be represented via its domestic political elites who seek local representation, rather than through kin state elites that circumvent their state of residence. Kin state representation tends to extinguish the minority status of the group, and ethnic liberalism with it.
Gulan: Your research demonstrates how minority political conduct is influenced by historical legacies, electoral incentives, and state structures. Which of these contextual elements do you think are most important right now, and how would migration or changing demographics affect these dynamics in the upcoming decades?
Professor Jan Rovny: In the context of European countries that I study, the most important dynamic is the presence of openminded majority political factions that would be ready to embrace cooperation with ethnic minority representatives. In the current climate of intense cultural competition which frequently pits nativist and pluralist views of society against one another, it is increasingly hard to find significant majority forces ready to engage with minority issues. In the absence of partnership, some of the important incentives of ethnic liberalism (as I define it) become unviable, leading minority representatives to either attempt exit, embrace unfruitful cooperation with illiberals, or to abandon minority representation all together.
Demography also plays an important role. Many historical minorities in Europe have an increasing rate of assimilation into the majority culture. This on the one hand suggests that ethnic distance and hostility between these minority groups and the majority have declined significantly. It, however, also means that several minority groups will become numerically too weak to be able to support representatives that could be politically successful.
Gulan: You demonstrate that ethnic minorities don't just follow identity-driven choices but also operate strategically inside political institutions. What does this mean for current discussions about identity politics, namely the conflict between democratic coherence and group-based representation in societies that are becoming more diverse?
Professor Jan Rovny: My work demonstrates that under a set of conditions, identity-driven preferences can be perfectly consistent with ideological democratic competition. In fact, identity concerns often constructively inform ideological preferences that can be represented and negotiated in government, with the effect of strengthening democracy. The fact that ethnic minority representatives can be skillful politicians who navigate the strategic environment of their political systems simply means that they – like all other political actors – can be effective politicians.
Gulan: Will political parties evolve into flexible, issue-oriented networks as societies grow more individualistic, digital, and distrustful of conventional institutions, or will they become irrelevant, allowing democracy to be transformed by new, less accountable modes of political engagement?
Professor Jan Rovny: The fundamental function of political parties is to simplify the complexity of multiple political issues and preferences, and provide citizens with concise and understandable policy proposals or ideological packages. Technological innovation and social change will alter what these issues and preferences may be, but it will not change the fact that modern societies face a vast array of political options. Political parties are there to help us navigate and select between these options. Once they carry these preferences into state institutions and government, they also become responsible for negotiating and implementing them, providing political accountability. As long as citizens are involved in political decision making, in selecting political programs and vetting their implementation – that is, as long as we have democracy – we will need political parties.
