Federalism remains one of the most significant systems of governance for managing diversity, balancing power, and protecting democracy. While its theory is well understood, its practice varies greatly across nations — often reflecting unique political, historical, and cultural contexts.

To gain deeper insight into how federal and constitutional systems evolve, Gulan Weekly Magazine spoke with Professor John Dinan, a leading scholar of American federalism and comparative constitutionalism. Professor Dinan’s extensive research examines constitutional development, state–federal relations, and the principles that make federal systems endure. In this interview, he shares his perspectives on the core logic of federalism, its application in divided societies, and the lessons Iraq might learn from long-standing federations.

Gulan: At its foundation, federalism divides power between national and regional governments. From your research, what constitutional philosophy or practical problem was federalism originally designed to address? 

Professor John Dinan: When the framers of the U.S. Constitution in 1787 adopted the world’s first federal system, they were in part guided by practical considerations.  They were seeking to create a more powerful central government and common economic market capable of overcoming problems stemming from a confederal government (the Articles of Confederation) in place during most of the Revolutionary War.  However, the framers acknowledged that the original 13 states would not agree to give up their sovereign powers to the extent of establishing a unitary form of government.  As a result, they compromised and designed a federal system that apportioned sovereignty between a federal government and state governments.  However, as the authors of The Federalist argued while defending the proposed Constitution during the ratification debates in 1787-1788, dividing power between national and subnational governments also contributes to more effective governance and protection of rights than would be achieved under either a confederal or unitary government, and therefore a federal government was established in part because of these virtues.

Gulan: Many of your writings emphasize how federal constitutions adapt over time. What factors allow a federal constitution to remain durable while still accommodating social and political change?

Professor John Dinan: The U.S. Constitution is a notably short and spare document that authorizes the federal government to act for certain enumerated purposes and prohibits state governments from taking certain actions, but the U.S. Constitution otherwise steers clear of prescribing specific policy responsibilities for the federal and state governments, thereby allowing for an evolution of authority over time.  At times, this evolution has taken place through the federal constitutional amendment process, most notably when passage of the Fourteenth Amendment in the aftermath of the Civil War enhanced the federal government’s authority to protect individual rights.  At other times, the U.S. Supreme Court has been responsible for adjusting the balance of federal and state authority, through rulings allowing or disallowing federal or state government actions.  In the vast majority of cases, the evolution of authority has taken place through the political process, with federal or state governments assuming greater responsibility for policymaking in response to public support for one or the other governments taking the lead in various areas.

Gulan: Federal systems in Canada, Switzerland, and the United States have managed to balance unity and diversity, while others face recurring crises. In your view, what distinguishes successful federations from those that struggle to maintain cohesion?

Professor John Dinan: Scholars have long debated how much emphasis to place on institutional design and how much weight to assign to political culture when explaining the endurance of federal systems.  Both are important to some degree.  On one hand, federal systems are likely to endure when governing institutions are structured to allow adjustments over time in the relative balance of power between national and subnational governments and in a way that addresses the needs of the polity and citizenry without needing to resort to wholesale constitutional revision or replacement.  At the same time, federal systems’ endurance also depends on political culture and citizen mores (to draw on a concept highlighted by Montesquieu), and in particular whether citizens feel a sufficiently strong attachment to the federation while also respecting and tolerating difference and diversity among the regions.    

Gulan: You have written extensively about state constitutions and their role within a federal framework. How do subnational governments contribute to the vitality of a federation, and what risks arise when they are politically or fiscally dependent on the central government?

Professor John Dinan: Subnational governments contribute to the vitality of federations in various ways.  In the U.S. and other federations where subnational governments exercise significant responsibility for making policy and raising revenue independent of the national government, subnational governments often serve as laboratories of experimentation by adopting innovative policies and allowing their effects to be assessed before they might be enacted by the central government.  Subnational governments also make additional contributions, especially in the U.S., by monitoring central government actions and pushing back against central government directives seen as unwarranted or unwise.  In the U.S., state attorneys general routinely file federal lawsuits challenging the actions of presidents or federal agencies, and state officials occasionally decline to help federal government officials enforce federal policies, where doing so is optional, and for the purpose of contesting federal government actions.

It is also worth taking note of the roles played in particular by subnational constitutions, which are a feature of about half of the world’s federations.  Subnational constitutions contribute to the vitality of federal systems in part by serving as an additional means of protecting individual rights.  In the U.S., especially, state supreme courts frequently rely on state constitutional guarantees to issue decisions requiring greater protection for rights than is required by the federal constitution.  Meanwhile, in some other federations with multiple ethnic groups that are coextensive with regional governments, subnational constitutions have at times served as vehicles for recognizing groups’ distinctive foundational commitments and thereby helped accommodate racial, religious, and national pluralism.

Gulan: In federal systems, courts often serve as arbiters between different levels of government. What makes a constitutional court effective in resolving intergovernmental disputes, and how can it preserve public trust when its decisions are politically sensitive?

Professor John Dinan: A key challenge in designing and maintaining federations is establishing mechanisms for resolving disputes about the respective authority of central and subnational government and adjudicating collisions between these governments.  In most federations this task is undertaken predominantly, though not always exclusively, by constitutional courts.  In establishing an effective constitutional court, one goal is to render the judges sufficiently independent, whether by giving them long terms or otherwise insulating them from reprisals from other officials, that they can issue rulings that may in some cases limit the central government’s authority but may in other cases constrain subnational governing authority.  Another goal is to build a political culture that promotes respect for the rule of law and compliance with court decisions even when they might be unpopular.