Dr. Maja Sahadzic is Assistant Professor of Constitutional Law at the School of Law and Researcher at Montaigne Center for Rule of Law and Administration of Justice (Utrecht University), Visiting Professor (University of Antwerp), Senior Research Fellow (Law Institute in B&H), Fellow (Netherlands Institute of Human Rights - SIM) and Affiliated Scholar (Center for Comparative and Transnational Law at CUHK). Maja is Co-chair of the Committee on New Directions in Scholarship of the ICON S, the largest international learned society with members from all around the globe. Before joining Utrecht University, she was Assistant Professor and Postdoc (University of Antwerp) while she also held other academic positions in Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, and the United States.  Her research revolves around multilevel governance, dynamic legitimacy, dynamic stability, asymmetries, constitutional values and principles, rule of law, authoritarianism, antidemocratic risks caused by technology, alternative conflict solutions, power shifts, and constitutionalism under extreme measures. Her passion is also the methodology of (legal) research. Her research is interdisciplinary and comparative and she often experiments with methodological frameworks that include a fusion of empirical and qualitative approaches. In a written interview sher ansewered our questions like the following:  

Gulan: In your research on dynamic legitimacy and dynamic stability, how do you see these concepts helping us understand the resilience (or fragility) of contemporary constitutional systems?

Dr. Maja Sahadzic: Among other reasons, dynamic legitimacy and dynamic stability provide us with a richer lens for understanding why some contemporary constitutional systems remain resilient while others appear fragile. Especially in systems with asymmetrical arrangements, legitimacy cannot be captured through a single, static framework - unless one’s idea of constitutional design is to fit diversity into a one-size-fits-all straitjacket and call it federalism. Instead, it must reconcile territorial authority with multiple sources of identity (both supported by additional factors such as economic development, historical context, separatist movements, etc.), balancing horizontal legitimacy between sub-national entities and vertical legitimacy between citizens and government. This requires that, for example, representation and participation must not only be tied to the central level but also extended across multiple levels of government. Crucially, legitimacy becomes less about permission granted by the center and more about a polycentric and inclusive process, emerging not just from citizens’ participation but also from mutual recognition among sub-national entities themselves. Iraq offers a particularly instructive example. Its post-2005 constitutional order is highly asymmetrical, with the Kurdistan Region enjoying substantial autonomy and other governorates empowered to claim similar status. The resilience of Iraq’s system depends on whether legitimacy is perceived as inclusive, not just permission from Baghdad, but a process of mutual approval and representation across the different levels. When this legitimacy falters, as in disputes over oil revenue sharing or federal authority, the system’s fragility becomes clear (and constitutional lawyers everywhere quietly update their conference papers).

Similarly, stability in these systems cannot be reduced to homogeneity or loyalty. Pursuing uniformity can actually undermine cohesion by provoking resistance from entities that fear losing their autonomy, usually based on their distinctive identity - a reminder that “one size fits all” is a perilous tailoring strategy for constitutions. Instead, stability must be seen as dynamic, maintained through continuous recalibration. Dynamic stability suggests that resilience depends on adaptiveness (that allows institutions to accommodate shifting territorial identities and power balances), trust (that builds confidence that each actor’s position will be respected even as change occurs – something like confidence in the fair management of the system), and coordination (that ensures communication and cooperation across levels of government). Together, these dynamics help transform conflict into negotiated solutions, turning instability into stability - or at least into something conference panels can optimistically call “a work in progress”.

Together, dynamic legitimacy and dynamic stability help explain why constitutional systems endure. They shift the focus away from static balance and toward processes of inclusion, adaptation, and mutual consent. A resilient constitutional system, then, is not one that resists change but one that transforms conflicts into cooperation through the continuous management of diversity.

Gulan: Many constitutional systems face asymmetries and uneven power distributions. What lessons can be drawn from your work for ensuring that such asymmetries remain a source of flexibility rather than instability?

Dr. Maja Sahadzic:The main lesson is that asymmetries do not have to be a weakness, they can be a strength if they are managed through adaptiveness, trust, and coordination. Indeed, asymmetrical systems, like Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Indonesia, Iraq, Malaysia, Spain, the UK, and many more, are inherently complex, with territorial, identity-based differences built into the constitution. The challenge is to keep the system flexible by regularly recalibrating status, power-sharing, and fiscal arrangements to reflect changing realities. But flexibility works only if it is paired with mutual trust and open communication, much like a well-functioning partnership or team. When trust is low, asymmetries become a source of conflict rather than flexibility. Catalonia’s unsuccessful fiscal negotiations and the 2017 referendum showed how mistrust grew and instability followed.

The real challenge is not to eliminate differences but to manage them, turning them into a tool for democratic problem-solving rather than a trigger for crisis. This is when asymmetries become a source of creativity and compromise rather than conflict. When systems create channels for dialogue, protect diversity, and ensure participation in decision-making, asymmetries become a source of flexibility and innovation. When these channels are blocked, they produce mistrust, structural and fiscal conflict, and ultimately constitutional gridlock - a state of affairs that keeps constitutional lawyers busy and constitutional courts employed.

Gulan: You have written about the antidemocratic risks posed by technology. Could you elaborate on how digital innovations simultaneously empower and endanger constitutional democracies?

Dr. Maja Sahadzic: Digital technologies are double-edged tools for constitutional democracy: They democratize access and participation, but they also create new avenues for control and manipulation. On the empowering side, technology lowers barriers to entry, broadens deliberation, and can bring citizens closer to decision-makers, at least in theory. In post-conflict or divided societies, it can be used to facilitate dialogue across fault lines, streamline service delivery, and improve transparency.

But technology also concentrates power in ways our constitutions were never designed to handle. My research on Big Tech shows how private platforms have quietly accumulated functions traditionally reserved for the state: They write rules, enforce them, and even adjudicate disputes. This effectively makes Big Tech an anti-center or even a “fourth pillar” of governance, one that is largely immune from the checks and balances that restrain public power. That is a constitutional challenge, not a merely technical one. Although I suppose “terms of service” is the closest thing we now have to a social contract, and you cannot even negotiate those.

We should be honest: The tools that enable citizen empowerment are the same tools that enable mass surveillance, algorithmic bias, microtargeted disinformation, and the quiet normalization of “technofeudalism”. The problem is not that technology is dystopian, it is that it is, from time to time, amoral, and its constitutional consequences depend on whether we build mechanisms for accountability, transparency, and equality into the system. In other words, if technology is to stabilize democratic expectations rather than erode them, it must be anchored in the rule of law and embedded within cooperative governance frameworks that prevent both arbitrary state use and unaccountable private power. Or, to put it more dryly: Technology can expand democracy’s public square, or privatize it. The constitutional choice is whether we let the algorithms set the terms of citizenship or insist that citizenship sets the terms for the algorithms.

Gulan: Based on your expertise in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Balkan politics, what broader lessons can be extracted for other deeply divided or post-conflict societies?

Dr. Maja Sahadzic: From Bosnia and Herzegovina and the wider Balkans, the main lesson for deeply divided or post-conflict societies is that “grand constitutional moments” are usually less grand than they sound. Bosnia’s experience shows why: The current “status quo,” built on institutionalized conflict and veto politics, depresses trust, slows decision-making, and leaves citizens feeling hostage to both domestic elites and international actors. A comprehensive overhaul is therefore unrealistic. What I do believe should work is that the system does not need to be reinvented at every crisis. It needs to be coordinated, recalibrated, and occasionally reminded that paralysis is not a constitutional principle.

Second, asymmetry is neither the villain nor the hero, it is simply the reality. Bosnia is often portrayed as an exotic case of “extreme asymmetry”, yet on closer inspection, the constitutional asymmetries are modest and lie mostly in status, not in powers or fiscal autonomy. Much of the drama lies not in the constitutional text but in the political theatre around it. The real challenges come from how institutions operate: parity rules, entity voting, and overused blocking tools that sap responsiveness and accountability. A better approach is to build trust and coordination across all levels, horizontal and vertical, so that vetoes become a last resort rather than the first instinct or even hobby.

Third, external leverage cannot and should not substitute for domestic consensus. Two decades of non-implementation of ECHR judgments and intermittent international fixes have produced many reports, a few new rules, and very little in the way of greater domestic trust. International actors can nudge, but they cannot manufacture consensus, at least not a consensus that lasts beyond the press release. Reform must be locally negotiated, transparently communicated, and incrementally sequenced, with international actors enabling dialogue rather than dictating design.

Finally, move the debate from “unitary vs. federal” labels to practical federal principles: internal coordination, integrated political parties, and policy instruments that tie communities together administratively and economically. This can help make small but cumulative adjustments that reduce the need for vetoes, widen participation, and turn diversity into a managed source of stability rather than a trigger for crisis. After all, in constitutional politics as in life, stability is less about avoiding conflict altogether and more about having rules robust enough to survive it.

Gulan: Your work often emphasizes interdisciplinary and methodological innovation. How do you see methodological experimentation shaping the future of constitutional law and governance research?

Dr. Maja Sahadzic: Methodological experimentation is essential for the future of constitutional law and governance research, but it needs to be deliberate rather than fashionable. My work argues for a “methodological sequence” rather than a “methodological buffet”. In other words, before running to borrow methods from political science, sociology, or data science, we must first reclaim legal methodology as a discipline in its own right. Too often, law schools leave methodology implicit, leaving scholars to “learn by doing”, a practice that is exciting but also prone to conceptual shortcuts. Once that foundation is secured, interdisciplinarity could become a powerful tool rather than an academic identity crisis. A well-trained legal scholar who understands legal methods can engage political science, economics, or anthropology in a way that enriches, rather than dilutes, legal analysis. Methodological innovation, then, should not be about abandoning law’s normative and doctrinal strengths, but about complementing them with empirical, quantitative, and comparative tools when the research question truly requires them.

In short, the future of constitutional scholarship will likely be more experimental, but it should also be more self-aware. In other words, not every constitutional question needs a regression table, but if it does, the scholar should know why.

Gulan: In moments of extreme measures—such as states of emergency or authoritarian pushbacks—what constitutional strategies or frameworks can protect the rule of law and prevent erosion of rights?

Dr. Maja Sahadzic: Moments of extreme measures, whether natural disasters, pandemics, or authoritarian pushbacks, are the ultimate stress test for constitutional systems. They expose whether the established rule-of-law framework is merely decorative in calm times or resilient when a true emergency happens. My research on extreme constitutionalism shows that power-sharing without coherent coordination mechanisms can paralyze decision-making just when unified action is most needed.

The first lesson is that constitutions must plan for emergencies before they arrive. That means clearly allocating powers for crisis response, establishing procedures for both vertical and horizontal coordination, and embedding judicial review to prevent emergency powers from mutating into permanent exceptions. The second lesson is that community response can complement institutional action, but it cannot replace it, otherwise, we outsource crisis governance to social capital and hope that solidarity is more resilient than bureaucracy.

Gulan: From your experience as a consultant and adviser to international organizations, how do external actors (such as the UN, EU, or bilateral missions) shape domestic constitutional trajectories, and what are the risks of such involvement?

Dr. Maja Sahadzic: I have many thoughts on this topic, but I will focus on the most important points. Their involvement can catalyze reform and protect fragile rights, but it also carries the risk of undermining local legitimacy, turning constitutional change into an imposition rather than a socially rooted transformation. External actors often get to define what “good reform” means. Their criteria may push domestic actors to adopt constitutional amendments or institutional designs they would not otherwise prioritize. This can be helpful in overcoming local gridlock, but it also risks making national actors passive implementers rather than active co-creators. However, when external actors hold “carrots” and “sticks”, domestic leaders may prioritize what satisfies external benchmarks rather than local legitimacy or durability. They may cut corners, adopt symbolic rather than structural changes, or game reforms to tick boxes without addressing root imbalances. International involvement can also provide technical assistance, financial support, comparative insights, and legitimacy for contentious reforms. In places lacking strong legal or administrative tradition, that support can help prevent sloppy constitutional design. The challenge is ensuring that external influence is gradually removed, not transformed into dependency. However, whenever external actors intervene, local actors can portray reforms as impositions of foreign will, feeding narratives of external dominance or neo-colonialism.  A central danger is creating constitutional systems that survive only with external guardians. Once international presence wanes, reforms collapse if local actors never assume ownership. This is often seen where peacekeeping or transitional missions remain indefinitely, without a clear timeline or plan for local handover.