Ferran Requejo is Professor of Political Science at Pompeu Fabra University in Barcelona. His research focuses on political liberalism, theories of democracy, federalism, nationalism, and the management of cultural and religious diversity in democratic societies. His recent publications include Federalism, Consociationalism and Secession

Gulan: With more than 40 million people divided across Iraq, Iran, Syria, and Turkey, the Kurds remain the largest nation without a state. As a scholar of multinational states, how do you interpret the Kurdish case, and what does it reveal about the dilemmas of nationhood in the modern world?

Ferran Requejo: The Kurdish case is one of the most challenging empirical cases of comparative federalism. When we try to analyse a complex reality like this, it is necessary to take into account three perspectives. Firstly, the theoretical approach about the advantages and disadvantages of federal agreements in relation to centralised or regional models. For example, the classical question “why federalism?” has been answered in different ethical, pragmatic or functional ways. In this sense, there have also been different approaches about what is, or should be, the relationship between federalism and nationalist processes (federal-building versus nation-building).

Secondly, we must consider the main conclusions of comparative analyses of federations: federations usually fail when institutional and decision-making solutions are unconnected with the empirical trends of specific societies. Finally, a key point is to take into account the historical and empirical culture of a specific case (its history, religious traditions, ethnic and linguistic complexity, leaderships, political organizations).

All these perspectives are important to avoid some kind of “theoretical and institutional colonialism.” You know, when some politicians (and scholars) think that Western liberal solutions can be universally applied.

Years ago, I was invited to Iraq as part of an international team of scholars asked to prepare a report about a potential federal model for the post-war period. I declined the invitation for security reasons (the organizers insisted that the “green area” was completely safe, but an attack occurred there a few days later, so I think I made the right decision). As a result, my approach to the Kurdish case has remained analytical from outside the region—following the history and main events in Iraq, Syria, Iran, and Turkey. This is not ideal, of course, because knowledge on the ground is sometimes key for nuance. But desires and reality do not always fit in life.

Gulan: In today’s global politics, democracy and federalism are often invoked as remedies for national conflicts. Yet when federal systems fail—as in Iraq—the international community remains silent. Meanwhile, when nations demand their right to self-determination, the same community refuses to recognize them. Why does the international system tolerate these contradictions, and why are the rights of nations so often denied?

Ferran Requejo: This is a very easy question. The “international community” is just a system of states (wrongly called sometimes “nation-states” because some of them are plurinational, not uninational). And all states in the world are nationalist. There is no exception on the planet.

The main interests in the battleground are local, “statist” (economic, political, cultural). The “international community” fails. Actually, it does not exist in moments of crisis. Nowadays, the United Nations is just becoming a sort of “engine of words.” The European Union is becoming a residual international actor—it lacks an autonomous defence system and a shared foreign policy.

“Self-determination” is, in practical terms, a political objective, a claim. The approach of a “right” of self-determination belongs more to the field of ethics than politics. Even within the sphere of Western democracies, constitutionally speaking, this right is rare. As you know, there are different approaches in democratic theory when we consider whether to include a “right to secession” in democratic entities. In practice, only states have this right: they recognize it only for themselves. In other words, democratic states are more “states” than “democratic.”

Philosophically, in international relations, Hobbesian and Hegelian realistic perspectives work analytically better than Kantian or Rawlsian ethical perspectives. Obviously, this is what it is—not what it could, should, or must be according to democratic patterns.

Pull Quote: “Democratic states are more ‘states’ than ‘democratic’.”

Gulan: One of your books, Federalism, Consociationalism and Secession, is especially meaningful for us as Kurds. In Iraq, both federalism and consociationalism failed to secure Kurdish rights, pushing us toward the 2017 independence referendum. If federalism and power-sharing cannot succeed, what other pathways remain for multinational states beyond outright secession?

Ferran Requejo: Comparative politics show three solutions to manage complex realities based on national or ethnic pluralism: federalism, consociationalism, and secession. “Federalism” is a very large concept, which includes different “federal agreements” (confederations, asymmetrical and symmetrical federations, associated states, federacies, regional states). Consociationalism and even secession can be combined with federal solutions, as in Belgium or Canada.

I think secession rules must include the practice of democratic referendums within the territory of minorities. Although almost all states, including liberal-democratic ones, are reluctant to open the door to potential secessions (human beings are primates, and territoriality is usually a strong group trend), there are institutional and political practices that can help. If not to solve tensions permanently, at least to manage them more justly than traditional centralized models.

The objectives are twofold: first, political recognition of the state’s national pluralism; and second, constitutional accommodation of this pluralism through a set of individual and collective rights—including language, culture, symbols, powers of self-government (even some elements of foreign relations), and clear procedural rules. Accommodation means minorities feel at home.

When implementing these objectives, history and culture matter. For instance, the number of units in a federation is crucial: with fewer units (say, three), asymmetry works better than in large federations with many units, where territorial grievances appear almost automatically.

To share common values is not enough to guarantee the will to live together. Institutions alone are not enough; solidarity and pragmatic consensus are also needed. The mediation of an external international actor may be useful here. If not, minorities must maintain enough practical power to resist assimilation by majorities. In the end, this is the national version of the “tyranny of the majority.”

Pull Quote: “Accommodation means that minorities feel comfortable—that minorities feel at home.”

Gulan: Political theory defines federalism as a “voluntary union.” But when that voluntary spirit collapses—as with the Kurdistan referendum of September 25, 2017 (92.7% voting for independence) and Catalonia’s October 1, 2017 referendum (90% voting ‘Yes’)—both Baghdad and Madrid responded with force. Why were these democratic decisions not respected?

Ferran Requejo: I think this has already been partly answered. There are around 23 federations (broadly speaking) in the world. Not all reflect a “voluntary union.” Some were forced. Minorities must calculate carefully when organizing referendums against the will of the central state.

In Catalonia, elites organized a referendum in October 2017 against the Spanish government. Citizens in favor of secession voted massively, producing a huge “yes” majority, but turnout was only around 40%. Spanish nationalists boycotted it. Moreover, Catalan elites were divided and had no consensual plan for the aftermath. They failed completely to sustain the result. The Spanish government responded with repression: imprisonment, exile, police force. Nobody was killed, but secession—and even improved accommodation—has been frozen.

Even in democratic states, regarding secession, the main political question is not the “what” or the “why,” but the “how.”

Gulan: For the past 250 years, nationalism has been both a source of war and of peace. Ultimately, the global system recognized nation-states as the cornerstone of stability, and today more than 200 exist worldwide. If stateless nations like the Kurds were finally given their own states, would this not contribute to greater global peace and security?

Ferran Requejo: At the beginning of the 20th century, there were around 50 states in the world. A century later, there are around 200. The global tendency is toward more states.

Political recognition of national pluralism and constitutional accommodation of minorities work in favor of stability and peace. More states, combined with more international agreements, also seems a stabilizing factor. But states are very conservative with their borders. Most borders have been established by force—wars, annexations—rarely through democratic means. Constitutions tend to entrench this conservatism.

Looking at the Kurdish case from outside, Iraq and Syria appear more promising than Iran and Turkey for recognition and accommodation. Today, Kurdistan stands as one of the most important cases globally where national liberation and democratic patterns can fit together. But rights are only stable when assured by effective power.