Marc Sanjaume-Calvet, is an Assistant Professor of Political Science at Universitat Pompeu Fabra and a member of the Social and Political Theory Research Group. He has previously taught at Universitat Oberta de Catalunya, served as an advisor at the Self-Government Studies Institute (Catalan Government), and conducted research at Edinburgh University, Université Laval, and Université du Québec à Montréal. He specializes in the study of federalism and self-determination, with a focus on secessionism, territorial conflicts, and governance in multi-level states. In an exclusive interview He answered our questions like the following:

Gulan: Let us start with a theoretical question about federalism, as it has been often described as both a mechanism for accommodation and a source of conflict. So, to what extent do you think federal arrangement can genuinely reconcile the tension between state unity and national state determination?

Professor Marc Sanjaume-Calvet: federalism in a broad sense has always been the institutional mechanism to accommodate territorial tensions and territorial pluralism in national terms. However, there are many types of federal arrangements, and from my point of view, federalism has to accomplish the federal system or the federal arrangement that aims to solve a territorial conflict. For example, at the conflicts that we have seen in Kurdistan and in Catalonia, a potential federal arrangement should have some characteristics that make it suitable to solve the conflict. Among these characteristics, I think that the most important ones are related to political power. And these federal arrangements must stop or must be able to block the tyranny from the center, the tyranny from the capital from Baghdad, from Madrid, and must be able to give some leverage in political terms to the region. In order to do that, some potential, and very different arrangements can be designed. I give you two extreme examples. One extreme example would be a sort of autonomy that isolates the federal unit and gives a lot of self-rule to the unit, and the federal unit would not be, so to speak, bothered by the center, accordingly, this is very suitable for islands and for small units. Small units that are federated with a big state, but they can manage their own laws, their own administration, and also their own taxes. I give you an example. South Tyrol, which is a tiny region in northern Italy in which the German minority obtained a very, very large amount of autonomy. They do not have a strong word in Rome, but they do not need a strong word in Rome because they have a lot of autonomy. And they can raise taxes, they can manage their own laws, and they manage their own region. A completely different example, the opposite, would be a big unit. That aims to achieve self-determination within a federation, and then some very strong federal institutions at the center, for the region, but also for the whole state, have to be implemented. For example, Switzerland is a paradigm of consociationalism, and they even share the federal units, they even share the central government. Another example would be, the German form of federalism in which the territorial chamber has a lot of power in deciding over the laws. But this is a form of federalism in which the regions or the territorial units share central power. So, there are these two extreme solutions. One solution would be this very strong autonomy and isolation. The other extreme solution would be sharing power in the central government.

Gulan: you have talked about Kurdistan region, so, let's make a comparison between Kurdistan and Catalonia, in both these cases, the demand for self-determination, emerged within states that already possess some degree of decentralization autonomy, thus, how do these cases, challenge classical theories of federalism and self-determination, which often assumes that autonomy reduces secessionist pressures?

Professor Marc Sanjaume-Calvet: These cases precisely show what I was telling you. The cases of Kurdistan and Catalonia show that not all autonomy arrangements are enough to accommodate minorities. As you know, in Kurdistan, as in Catalonia, there is still a lot of interference from the center on regional decisions. So, this is always a matter of degree. If you ask in Madrid, they will say that Spain is almost a federal state. If you ask in Barcelona, people will say that Spain is, or many people would answer that Spain is mostly a Unitarian state that has been decentralized. So, it's a matter of how you see the bottle, have empty, have full. In more precise terms, at least in the case of Catalonia, the matters about political power and also about finance are crucial here.Catalonia has no power to implement its own laws if they are struck down by the constitutional court. And during the last years, before the unilateral independence referendum, during many years, the Catalan parliament passed laws, among them the basic law of the Catalan autonomy, that where it was annulled by the constitutional court. Even in the case of the basic law for Catalan autonomy, the state of the autonomy, the law had been voted in the referendum in Catalonia and approved by the central parliament. And even in that situation, the Spanish Constitutional Court has struck down many articles of this law. This is regarding political power and legislative power, but also Catalonia has for a long time asked for more financial power, and Madrid is still refusing to give Catalonia the right to raise more taxes on its own. As for example, the Basque Country has the ability to do. In the case of the Basque Country, they have a special agreement with Madrid. They raise some taxes and by the end of the year they pay some money to the center. If Catalonia is the other way around, it's the center that tries taxes and then they give some money to Catalonia. So, these are two crucial elements, the financial issue and the capacity to legislate. There are also other issues that people tend to think that are not important, but are very, very important. I give you an example, recognition, or official recognition. Recognizing Catalonia as a nation has been a crucial element in Catalan secessionism and Catalan nationalism. And again, the Spanish central institutions and the Spanish Constitutional Court have repeatedly refused to recognize Catalonia as a nation. And Catalonia is still an autonomous community among other autonomous communities within the Spanish nation. There is only one Spanish nation and then there are some other, so there are regional powers, right? So, these symbolic elements matter a lot. You had some experience on that when the new Iraqi Constitution was drafted. As I told you, unless we are talking about a very tiny region or an island or a very isolated region, the structure of the federal system has to accommodate, at the center also, at the center of power, the minorities. And the minorities should have the right to veto decisions that affect them. Unless they have these powers, unless the national minorities, minority nations, within the state, feel that they are powerful within their own state and they have a say in the federal system, unless there is this situation, there will always be unrest and more autonomy demands, even secessionist demands.

Gulan: Federal constitutions in Iraq and Spain, often enshrine mechanisms for revenue sharing, for self-rule. So, do you consider the experiments of Catalonia and the Kurdistan region of Iraq as failure?

Professor Marc Sanjaume-Calvet: I wouldn't say that. I wouldn't use the strong word of failure. I think that the challenges in Iraq and in Spain are somehow different. In Iraq there was also a challenge of democratization and a challenge of development that was very important during this recent transition period. This reminds me of the case of Spain when the Constitution was drafted in Spain after the Franco dictatorship. And I think that at that time Spain faced similar problems. But one thing that we could say is that time, how time goes by, it's a very important barrier. An arrangement that can be done in a certain moment of transition can be successful in democratizing and in allowing the Constitution to be approved. But these arrangements must prove that they endure and must evolve if necessary. This is what in my opinion has failed, at least in the case of Catalonia. I do not know about Kurdistan to judge if the agreements have been a failure or not. But I think that in the case of Catalonia what is clear is that 40 years ago it was a clear success. Catalonia achieved both democracy and autonomy and some degree of recognition in the rest of Spain. And the Catalan language was recognized as an official language in Catalonia. That was very important. Catalonia developed its own police and its own schools. And that was very important for the Catalans. But that was 40 years ago, right? So, 40 years later Catalonia, it's a richer region, it's a very strong region within Spain. And the Catalans do feel that at that time they negotiated the Constitution, and they voted for the new Constitution, the new Spanish Constitution in the referendum, because it was an achievement. But maybe more than 40 years later, this achievement turned into a failure. Why? Well, because Catalonia has evolved and has ambitions, as a collectivity, as a nation. And these ambitions are not satisfied by its degree of power, right? So, that's very important. How these agreements that, after the fall of Saddam Hussein regime, how these agreements were possible at that time, and were supported at that time, also because of international pressure. But how these agreements look like now 20 years later? That's the most important question that you should ask for, in my opinion.

Gulan: picking up on one of the points you have described that international recognition is crucial, critical in determining the success or failure of the session as a project, but do you think that this resistance reflects a growing global reluctance to support a new statehood, and in your opinion, it is primarily driven by what?

Professor Marc Sanjaume-Calvet: I have to say that here I'm a bit pessimistic. I think that there used to be, more than 30 years ago, after the fall of the Berlin Wall, there was a moment of expansion of the right to self-determination. When the U.S.S.R. and former Yugoslavian Republic fell apart and all these new republics emerged during the 90s in the last century, it was a moment of optimism and a moment of hope for all the nations in the world that aspire to external self-determination to have their own state in the United Nations. I think that some people, some many citizens in Catalonia, for example, and probably in Kurdistan, they still have this hope. The problem is that we are not, as you know, we are not living in the same international atmosphere. We are now in a moment of, I would say, democratic backsliding and erosion of international norms. And among these international norms that are being eroded appears the right to self-determination. The right to self-determination is nowadays in danger, probably more than ever. We have seen what happened in Ukraine, with Russia, we are witnessing what is happening in Palestine. And I do think that we are in a bad moment for those that claim that the right to decide, the right to self-determination, the right to have your own state through a referendum should prevail. I think that these ideas are optimistic and full of hope that we are in a context, in an international context, in which these claims are not supported by the main forces. On the contrary, what we see is a strange twist, a strange return of empires, a strange return of imperialist ideas. And yes, of course, this can bring a lot of unpredictability, a lot of unpredictable events. I give you an example, nobody predicted the emergence of the Kosovo state. And Kosovo was supported only by the USA, and then they became independent. But Kosovo is not a member of the United Nations.

Gulan: what lesson do you think can be drawn from successful federal experiments or arrangements, such as Switzerland or Canada, for divided societies elsewhere, especially in Spain and Iraq?

Professor Marc Sanjaume-Calvet: Yeah, I think that the main conclusion is that political power is important, and is the key variable. So, we are talking about power, we can tame big states and powerful states, and also powerful capitals, like Baghdad, and Madrid, or Ottawa or Paris, they can tame, and domesticate those demands through powerful gestures, and some degree of autonomy, but at the end of the day, the lessons we can draw from these true federal experiences, the one in Belgium, the one in Switzerland, or in Canada, is that, first there is no ideal solution. So, there is always politics, there always debate on these federal models, so this will always be a debate in these, multinational states. Then, the important conclusion is that nationals Minorities should have a say, at the center. They should have a say in the central institutions, and that's difficult to achieve. So, it's a mix of protecting subgovernments, through taxing and through the resources that come with subgovernments’ responsibilities, but also shared rule, it's very important.  As I told you, one of the lessons that we get from these very multinational countries that keep together is that they hear each other, they discuss each other, and they decide together. If the majorities and the minorities cannot decide together, it's impossible that this will last. Over time, people will have feelings of being oppressed, and dominated by the stronger part, then they will ask for secession again. Accordingly, there is one solution in my opinion, that can take very different forms, and different details, which is sharing the state, and that is difficult when there is a national majority and a national minority. And that's the reality, that's part of the multinational states. And that is by definition they will face a conflict, and they will face this important debate, But the only solution, in my opinion, is Power sharing, which means that if there are territorial minorities that have resources, as you have in Kurdistan, they should have a say and they should be able to block some central decisions at some point. I do not know if Baghdad or Madrid are ready for that, but that is the reality.